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A Constitutional Examination ofthe Federal Exemptions
for Native American Religious Peyote Use*
I. INTRODUCTION

In enacting the American Indian Religious Freedom Amendments
Act of 1991 1 ("AI RF AA" or "the Act"), Congress sought to preserve the
sacramental use of peyote by traditional Native American religious practitioners by exempting members of federally recognized Indian tribes
2
from state and federal provisions prohibiting peyote possession and usc.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division,
Department ol Human Resources v. Smith 3 had put the question of
whether Native Americans may use peyote in religious services in a state
of uncertainty. 4 At the time Smith was decided, inconsistent state laws
provided weak protection f(x practitioners of the Native American
Church, 5 and 21 C.F.R. ~1307.31 6 ("~1307.31" or "the regulation"), a

I

Copyright 1<• 200 I Christopher Parker.
See42liXC.A. ~ 1996a(l994).

2.

Si!l! id The lilllowmg is selected text ofthe Act:

(a) The Congress finds and declares that
(I) l(,r many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as areligious sacrament has lilr centuries hecn integral to a "ay of lif'c, and significant in perpduating Indian trihcs and cultures.
(5 )the lack of adequate and clear legal protection t(Jr the religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmati,ce and rnarginali/.C Indian trihes and cultures, and increase the:
risk that they will he exposed to discriminatory treatment. ...
(h) (I) Notwithstanding any other rrovision of law. the use, possession, or transportation
of peyote hy an Indian f(lf hona fide traditional ceremonial rurroses in connection with
the rractice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not he prohihited by the
United States or any State.
(c) For purposes of this section
the term "Indian" means a mcrnbcr of an Indian trihe;
the term "Indian trihc" means any tribe ... which is recognized as eligible for the special
rrograms and services rrovidcd by the United States to Indians because
their status as
Indian'
"3. 494li.S.X72(1990).

or

4. I he :·)milh decision allowed states to rrohibit reyotc usc hy Native Americans without
running ai(Jul or the li.S. Constitution. /\t the time, states had widely dillcring laws and excertions
regarding peyote usc. l'rohlcms relating to this lack orunif(mnity will be discussed later in this Note.
5. Sec II.R. Rll'. No. 103-675 at 4-5 (1994). Important in any discussion or religious peyote
usc is the distinction hctwccn hranchcs or the Native American Church. The Native American
Church of North America and its branches limn a large, national organi~ation with srccilic membership requirements. See gl!lwru//y OM! R (' Sii WART, !'!·YO II· Rt:l.l<iiON: A IIISTORY, 239-64 (lJnivero,ity or Oklahoma l'rc:;s 19X7). For rurposes of this Note, the "Native American Church of North
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Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") regulation purporting to address some of these concerns, had received conflicting treatment by
7
courts. The regulation provided protection from prosecution for members of the Native American Church. 8 While the Drug Enforcement Administration had interpreted the language of ~ 1307.31 to be limited to
members of the Native American descent within the Native American
Church ("NAC"), at least one court had refused to follow that interpretation and held the regulation applicable to all members of Native Ameri9
can Church. Further, ~ 1307.31 did not preempt states from refusing protection to Native American practitioners of peyote religion.
AIRF AA was designed to preserve Native Americans' right to the
religious use of peyote by providing a nationwide exemption from prosecution.10 Arguably, the Act is a successful solution to the problem existing before and exacerbated by Smith. However, the same constitutional
challenges invoked by non-Native American members of the Native
American Church under ~ 1307.31 have been lodged against the exemption from prosecution provided by AlRF AA. 11 Petitioners have generally
cited both AIRF AA and ~ 1307.31 to invoke protection of their peyote
use. 12 Typical challenges of those claims center around ~ 1307.31 's requirement that those relying on the exemption be of a particular religion
and race. u Petitioners usually argue that the regulation violates the Free
America" will include the groups that practice traditional peyote religion and have a Native American ethnic descent requirement. Many other branches of the Native American Church have fewer
membership requirements and otlen no connection with any other Native American Churches; these
will be referred to in this Note as the "Native American Church" or "NAC." The difference between
the various groups using the Native American Church moniker has confused the jurisprudence in this
area of the law. See id. at 7-9.
6. 21 C.F.R. 9 1307.31 (200 I).
7. See United States v. Boy II, 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991) (holding that extending
regulatory exemption to only Native American members of the Native American Church would violate the Constitution); Native American Church of New York v. United Stales, 468 F. Supp. 1247
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that Congress intended the regulatory exemption to apply to all religions
using peyote in "bona fide" religious ceremonies); hut see United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595
(D.N.D. 1984) (accepting government's contention that regulatory exemption should apply only to
members of the Native American Church who are also Native Americans).
8. The fi.)llowing is selected text of 21 C.F.R. ~ 1307.31: "The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the non-drug usc of peyote in bona fide religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the Native American Church so using
peyote are exempt from registration." !d.
9. See Boy//, 774 F. Supp. at 1333.
10. See42U.S.C.A. ~ 1996a(b)(l) (1994) (stating that peyote use by "lndianls] for bona tide
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion ...
shall not be prohibited by ... any State").
II. Sec. e.g.. State v. Mooney, No. 001404536 (Utah Dist. Ct. tiled 2001 ), cert. granted, No.
200 I0787 (Utah Sup. Ct.) (prosecution of non-Native American operator of "Native American
Church'' for possession of a controlled substance and other related crimes).
12. See Boy//, 774 F. Supp. at 1333.
13. See id.; see also Mooney, No. 001404536 (Utah Dist. Ct. filed 200 I).
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Exercise Clause, because it unconstitutionally defines religious membership, that it violates the Establishment Clause, because it establishes a
preferred religion, and that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 14 Arguably, continuing use of these arguments
in post-AIRFAA cases suggests that AIRF AA has not been successful in
addressing the constitutional concerns raised by ~ 1307.31. Perhaps one
reason for this apparent failure is that ~ 1307.31 really adds nothing of
substance to the AIRF AA exemption, yet it continues in effect with language that raises serious concerns about the regulation's constitutionality.
This Note argues that the continued application of~ 1307.3 I jeopardizes the success of AIRF AA as a narrow but efTective exemption. It addresses the constitutionality of~ 1307.31 and AIRF AA. Part Ill will examine Equal Protection and Establishment Clause issues, because they
represent the most persuasive arguments, though free exercise arguments
will also be considered. Before embarking on those questions, Part II will
give a history of peyote use by Native Americans in religious ceremonies. This history gives context to the religious services referred to in
AIRF AA. It will also outline the religious structures that support these
ceremonies in order to understand the problems surrounding ~ 1307.3 I.
Having detailed problems with the coexistence of AIRF AA and
~ 1307.31, this Note will propose elimination of~ 1307.31. The removal
of~ 1307.31 from the current exemption scheme will address many of the
concerns raised by non-Native American religious peyote users and more
clearly express Congressional intent without significantly limiting the
reach of AIRF AA. This allows for peyote use by those whom Congress
wishes to protect while preventing widespread abuse of peyote-a concern of many who seek limits on peyote use. Part IV will give a brief
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Traditional Use

4 Peyote by Native Americans

Peyote is a "small, spineless cactus having psychedelic properties."''
Most scholars believe Native Americans have used peyote in the current
territory of the United States since the late eighteenth or early nineteenth

14. See. e.g. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991 );
Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984); Hoy//, 774 F. Supp. at
1333; Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Tex. 1988); United States
v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1984); Mooney, No. 001404536 (Utah Dist. Ct. tiled 2001 ).
15. STFW i\IU, supra note 5, at 3.
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century. 16 To the Native American religions that use it, peyote is treated
somewhat like deity. 17 The typical mode of ingesting peyote is by eating
the "buttons" or dried tops of the cactus. 1g The active ingredient in peyote, mescaline, produces a sort of "toxic delirium" that alters the senses
and may cause "dissociation of the intellectual part of the personality
from the rest of the mind." 19 This delirium may last up to ten hours. 20
Peyote is typically ingested in an all-night ceremony involving
prayer, singing, ingesting peyote, and contemplation. 21 Religious officials preside over the ceremony, usually held in a tipi. 22 These officials
each have certain functions to perform, and members often aspire to
work through the ranks to be qualified for each position. 23 Participants
are usually members of the Native American Church, but guests are often
welcomed. 24
The ceremony usually begins just after dark. The participants then
usually pray, ingest the peyote, sing, and contemplate until midnight. 25
There is then a "midnight ceremony" during which more peyote may be
ingested. 26 This is usually followed at dawn by more singing, prayer, and
a curing ceremony. 27 Breakfast may follow, after which the formal cereog
mony concludes.The lengthy nature of these ceremonies is likely one reason for the
exemption from controlled substances laws. Those abusing the substance
29
are not likely to do so in such a long and formal ceremony. The peyote
16. FDWi\Rll F. ANmRSON. PEYOTl'.: Till DJVINI· Ci\CTlJS, 25, 31 (University of Arizona
Press 19'16) ( 1980); J.S. SJOTKIN, Till' Pt·:YOTI' RJ'.LIUION, 28-44; STEW ART, supra note 5, at 45-67.
17. See SLO IKIN, supra note 16, at 76-77.
18 See ANDI RSON, supra note 16, at 50-51.
19. /d.. at 83.
20. Sec id. at 84 (cataloging in detail the many diverse effects of peyote on the user).
21. !d. at 49.
22. See id at 49, 52-53.
23. See id. at 53.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 55-57.
26. See id.. at 57.
27. See id at 57-58.
28. See id. at 58.
29. See ll.R. RIP. No. 103-675, at 15 (1994) (arguing, in a statement hy a DEA otlicial, that
there have been no problems with peyote abuse by members of the Native American Church). This
Note will later discuss this assertion in more detail, but it is worth noting here that the argument
against a restrictive exemption for religious ceremonies is not wholly persuasive. Though the ceremony is long and tedious, it is not only used in the ceremony that presents problems for those en!(Jrcing drug laws. The possession of peyote is illegal for those not using it in religious ceremonies,
and the presence of an exemption l(>r anyone practicing peyote religion overcomes this illegality.
Thus, the exemption could be a valuable tool t(Jr recreational users as they might periodically attend
peyote ceremonies and remain in good standing with the Church while diverting much peyote f(Jr
other uses. The discovery by law ent(Jrcement oflicers of peyote in the possession of such an individual would not he viewed as criminal though the usc of the peyote was not f(>r religious purposes.
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ceremony is less a tribal ceremony than it is a religious one. According to
one scholar, "the peyote ceremonies ... are remarkably homogenous
among the tribes of the United States and Canada." 30 One scholar says
that this homogeneity results from the distinction in modern peyote religion between church and tribe? 1 Thus, while Native Americans are members of certain tribes, their membership in the Native American Church is
viewed separately. Tribal distinctions are less important within this religious structure.
B. Native American Religions and the Structure qfthe Native American
Church

One observer has noted that religion cannot be understood in its
usual context when discussing Native American religious beliefs. 32 She
notes, "in traditional Native American thought, there is nothing that can
be labeled nonreligious." 33 This blend of culture and religion represents a
characteristic unique to Native American society. Because the Native
American society is an integrated culture quite different from American
culture, traditional judicial and legislative thinking is arguably not adequately geared toward dealing with the complex issues inherent in such a
society. Consequently, when Congress attempts to fill its role as a guardian of Native American culture, it is faced with the unenviable task of
doing so without violating its separate and apparently contradictory duties governing religious treatment. 34
The organization of the predominant peyote religions presents additional problems for Congress. The name "Native American Church" is
somewhat misleading, for it implies one organized church. In reality, the
"Native American Church" moniker is given to a myriad of loosely affiliated or unaffiliated organizations practicing "peyote religion." 35 There
is no single branch of the church, and no organization exists to dictate
policies and government of branches of the Native American Church. 36

This may he seen as a factual problem which can be overcome in certain circumstances. In reality
though, it is highly unlikely that law enf(Jrcement could ever overcome the exception in a case like
this.
30. !d. at 49.
31. See id.
32. See Ann F. Beeson, Dances With Justice: Peyotism in the Courts. 41 EMORY L.J. 1121,
1127-29 ( 1992).
33. /d.at 1128.
34. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,551-53 (1974) (discussing "guardian-ward" status
of Congress and Native Americans and Congress duty).
35. United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.N.M. 1991) (discussing the structure
of' the Native American Church).
36. See id.
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One organization, the Native American Church of North America, has,
among its many membership requirements, a mandate that members have
at least twenty-five percent Indian descent. 37 As an internal membership
requirement, this could obviously be rescinded by the Church upon
amendment. The Native American Church of North America is often referred to as the "mother church" and occupies a unique role in peyote religion.3x Many other churches that call themselves Native American
Churches exist and have similar peyote ceremonies. 39 The Native American Church of North America has had rivalries, disagreements, and other
problems with these other organizations. 40
The structure of the Native American Church, or the lack thereof,
creates difficulties when outsiders attempt to define its religion. Perhaps
Congress considered these difficulties when it opted to limit AIRF AA 's
reach to members of federally recognized Indian tribes. Although the
legislative history seems to suggest that Congress wished to use membership in the Native American Church to qualify the exemption, 41 it chose
to use tribal membership as the determinative factor. 42 In contrast,
§ 1307.3 I uses church membership as the qualification for its protection.
This difference in language creates problems for courts and endangers
the effectiveness of AIRF AA, because courts look to both AIRF AA and
§ 1307.31 for guidance in peyote cases.
Perhaps one reason for Congress's decision to use membership in an
Indian tribe as the qualifier for the exemption instead of membership in
the Native American Church was the conflicting judicial application of
the church qualification under § 1307.31. The regulatory exemption extends only to those engaged in "bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church." 43 Non-Native Americans have often used the
language of this exemption, which mentions no tribal membership, to
bolster the argument that they, as members of the Native American
Church, were allowed to use peyote. 44 In response, the government has
argued that the regulation should be interpreted to require the Native
17. See S II w 1\R I, supra note 5, at 333; see also II.R. Rl'l'. No. I 03-675, at 15 ( Jl)l)4) (statement by DE;\ official that members of Native American Church are required to be of Native American descent).
3X. S('(: S II w1\R I, supra note 5, at 23'>, 334 (discussing the role as mother church and noting
the broad scope of the Native American Church of North America).
39. See id. at334 (detailing diltcrences between organizations).
40. Sec id.
41 Sec ll.R. RIP. No. 103-675, at 3-4 (1'>'>4) (outlining the structure ofthe Native American
Church and recogni/ing it as the "present-day embodiment" of the traditional peyote religions it
sought to protect by passage orAIRF;\;\).
42. See 42 lJ .S.C.;\. § 19%a( c) ( 19'>4 ).
43. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2001).
44. See llnited States v. !loy II, 774 F. Supp. 1331 (D.N.M. 1'>91 ).
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American Church member to have Native American ancestry. 45 In
United States v. Boyll, a federal district court in New Mexico found the
government's interpretation to be against the plain language of the exemption.46 The court in Boyll also found that the government's proposed
interpretation would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution by imposing a racial exclusion on church membership. 47
Seeing that the church membership test had been criticized, concerns
such as that expressed by the Boyll court may have led Congress to reject
the Native American Church membership test for an exemption.
C. The Lack <~f Uniformity in Controlled Substance Laws, the Smith

Decision. and the Impetus for Change
Before AIRF AA and the Smith case, differing degrees of protection
were available for practitioners of peyote religion. Through § 1307.31,
the federal government exempted from federal controlled substances
laws those engaged in "bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church." 48 Procedurally, religious use as prescribed by the
regulation effected a removal of peyote from the listing of controlled
substances in the federal controlled substance provision found in 21
U.S.C.A. §812. Further, a survey of state laws at the time of AIRFAA's
passage indicated that twenty-eight states had varying degree of protection for peyote use. 49 Some states provided full protection for Native
Americans using peyote religiously while other states allowed religious
use as an affinnative defense in a criminal prosecution. 50 In Congress's
words, there was a "patchwork of laws" regarding the use of peyote in
religious ceremonies. 5 1 By the time the United States Supreme Court decided Smith, "2 the lack of uniform laws had become a visible political
problem.
The Court's decision in Smith established the constitutionality of
states' complete prohibitions on peyote use and possession. Two men,
both members of the Native American Church, were discharged from
their jobs and subsequently denied unemployment benefits by the State

45. See id at 1335 (citing the government's argument that the regulation should be restricted
to those members of the Native American Church having more than twenty-five percent descent
from "American Indian stock").
46. See id at 1338-39.
47. See id. at 1340.
48. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.3.
49. See II.R. Ri-1'. No. I 03-675, at 4-5 ( 1994 ).
50. See id
51. Su! id
52. Employment Div., Dcp't of !Iuman Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990).
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because the discharge was caused by their own misconduct. This misconduct consisted of the ingestion of peyote in a religious ceremony in
54
violation of the state's controlled substances laws. They argued that
they were entitled to unemployment benefits because the religious use of
peyote removed them from the criminal law, and, thus, from any mis5
conduct, based on the free exercise limitations of the First Amendment. 5
The Court rejected these arguments and held that a state could, consistent
with the First Amendment, prohibit the use of peyote even by religious
• .
'i6
practitiOners.From Smith, one may glean the broader rule in free exercise cases
that a state may prohibit religious practices so long as the law prohibitmg
7
such practices is neutral and generally applicable.' This rule rejected a
proposed test that would have required the government to show a "compelling state interest" to prevent certain conduct and to justify proscriptions on religious conduct. 5 x The Court also rejected a test that would
have required constitutional accommodation of religious practices only
59
when the practices in question are "central" to that religion. Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, recognized the judiciary's inability to make
such determinations and hinted at the inappropriateness ol such an inquiry.60 Further, the majority thought that its "centrality" concerns could
not likely be avoided, notwithstanding .Justice O'Connor's arguments to
the contrary:
"Constitutionally significant burden" would seem to be "centrality" under another name. In any case, dispensing: with a "centrality" inquiry is utterly unworkable. It would require, for example,
the same degree of "compelling state mterest" to 1111pedc the practice of throwing rice at church weddings as to impede the practice
of getting married in church. There is no way out of the difficulty
that, if general laws are to be subjected to a "religious practice"
exception, both the importance of the law at issue and the central61
ity of the practice at issue must reasonably be considcrcd

One of the majority's key policy arguments in favor of its rule was
that the application of the compelling interest test to all free exercise

53. Sec id at X74.
54.

Seeid

55. See id at X76-7X.
56. See id at X90.

57
5~

Sec id at XX5.
.'l'ee id at ~XR (stating that "lain) society adopting such a system would be courting anar-

chy'").
59. See id at XX6.
60.
61

See id at XX6-X7.
!d at X87, n. 4 (emphasis in original).
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cases would jeopardize the government's ability to require religious objectors to meet a variety of civic obligations, including "compulsory
military service ... , payment of taxes ... , health and safety regulation ... , drug laws ... , traffic laws ... , [and] animal cruelty laws." 62 The
court reiterated earlier decisions and justified its ruling by characterizing
all alternatives as creating a situation where every man "become[s] a law
unto himself." 63 Though the Court likely overstated these concerns, 64 its
justification for the "neutral and generally applicable" test is a strong one
and cannot be passed over lightly. Indeed, requiring the government to
jump the high hurdle of the compelling interest test whenever religious
conviction is invoked would be cumbersome. 65

D. AIRFAA 's Reaction to Smith
In the wake of the Smith decision, Congress was eager to provide a
meaningful measure of protection to Native Americans practicing their
traditional religion. 66 In accordance with this, Congress found:
Absent federal legislation, the question of whether a given state has a
compelling interest to prohibit the religious use of peyote by Indians is
one that would necessarily be determined by the courts on a State-byState basis. The Committee recognizes that such determination could
require numerous State supreme court decisions and a corresponding
number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions-with varying results possible, as well as numerous lower State and Federal court decisions. Such
piecemeal judicial resolution to this issue is not likely to produce uniform, just or equal results, and would be unduly burdensome, costly
and time consuming. The Committee recognizes that uniform and equal
protection of Indians without regard to State or reservation of residence, or tribal affiliation, can only be accomplished by Congress
67
through comprehensive legislation.

62. ld at 888-89 (internal citations omitted).
63. /d. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
64. What is not apparent is why the Court should impede religious practices so readily. ls a
test which is ditlicult for courts to administer one which is necessarily not constitutionally required?
If the constitution requires protection, it requires it even though it may burden the government. The
"government" includes the judiciary.
65. It is not within the scope of this Note to analyze whether the Smith court got it right when
it rejected the compelling interest test. However, it is worth noting that the Court's concerns about
the automatic invocation of the compelling interest test upon the mere mention of religious objection
arc well founded. Further, if the Free Exercise Clause is to be given teeth, it must extend beyond
mere belieC and the Constitution might require further inquiry into the seriousness of religious belief.
66. See H.R. Rl'l'. No. 103-675, at 5-6 (1994) (discussing Smith case, expressing Congress's
distaste for the Court's decision, and recognizing that traditional Native American religious practices
should be preserved to restore religious freedom in the wake of Smith).
67. !d. at 8.
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Congress chose to remedy the Smith ruling and to explicitly recognize an exception tied directly to the political status of the individual. 68
With AIRF AA, Congress established a bright-line rule: if one belonged
to a federally recognized Indian tribe, one was exempt from federal controlled substance provisions making peyote use and possession illegal.
However, the exemption applied only in religious services and for ceremonial uses. 69
Under this narrow exception, certain individuals may not qualify
even ifNative American by descent, because they do not belong to a federally recognized tribe. Likewise, under § 1307.31 's provisions, there
may be members of a federally recognized Indian tribe who are not
members of the Native American Church. Consequently, either tribal
members or NAC members would not be eligible for protection depending on the invoked exemption. This inconsistency between the Act and
§ 1307.31 must have been apparent to Congress during its consideration
of AIRFAA.
Perhaps one reason why Congress chose to apply the Act's exemption to members of tribes recognized by the federal government was the
recognition of the political/racial distinction drawn in the United States
Supreme Court's landmark case Morton v. Mancari, which recognized
Congress's broad latitude in matters regarding Native American governance. 70 This conclusion seems consistent with the legislative history of
AIRF AA, which expressly considered the Morton case in the discussion
of the Act's constitutionality. 71 Thus, Congress seemed to have purposely
chosen to avoid the problematic language of§ 1307.31 by giving a different scope to the AIRF AA exemption.
Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Constitutional Challenges to the Current Exemptions Scheme
As noted above, there have been various challenges to the exemptions contained in §1307.31 and AIRFAA. They will be discussed here,
and particular attention will be given to the more consequential Establishment Clause and Equal Protection arguments.

68. See42 U.S.C.A. § 1996a(c)(l994).
69. See id. § 1996a(b )(I ).
70. See H.R. Rl'l'. No. 103-675, at 8-9 ( 1994) (citing Morton f(lr the proposition that Indian
tribes enjoy special legal status under federal law and the U.S. Constitution, which status will provide justification for special legislation that benefits the tribes while excluding other groups).
71. See id
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1. Post-Smith Free Exercise Clause challenges generally
The Smith case has become the starting point in cases decided under
the Free Exercise Clause. In the post-Smith period, inquiries concerning
the constitutionality of any given piece of legislation must begin with a
determination of whether the law in question is "neutral" and "generally
72
applicable." Neutrality and general applicability, according to the Smith
court, "are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one requirement is a
likely indication that the other has not been satisfied." 73 In the context of
the exemptions provided by AIRF AA and § 1307.31, the neutrality and
general applicability discussion is complicated by the fact that the question may be framed in one of two ways: 1) are the controlled substances
laws under which defendants are charged neutral and generally applicable, or 2) is the exemption, which the defendant seeks to invalidate or extend, neutral and generally applicable?
Intuitively, it seems that the courts should focus the neutrality and
applicability discussions on the broader controlled substances law to
which the defendant has been subjected. On the other hand, broad exemptions provided to others may be so widespread as to negate any underlying generality. 74 However, both §1307.31 and the AIRFAA exemptions are rather narrow in their scope.

2. AIRFAA and§/307.31 pass the Smith Free Exercise Clause tests
In Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a law prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices by members of the
Santeria religion. 75 The city in which the church was located allowed virtually universal exemptions from the law; the only conduct proscribed
was that of the church. 76 Given the targeted effect of the law, the Supreme Court, after applying the compelling governmental interest test,
struck down the law as unconstitutionally prohibiting religious conduct. 77
Thus, the compelling interest test is appropriate where the law does not
meet the neutrality and general applicability requirements of Smith. 78

72. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,885 (1990) (stating
that enforcement of generally applicable laws cannot be predicated on lack of religious objections).
73. !d
74. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-35 ( 1993)
(holding that"[ f]acial neutrality is not determinative" and that "the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object").
75. See id
76. Seeid.
77. See id at 546-47.
78. See id. at 546 (holding that such a law "must advance 'interests of the highest order' and
must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests").
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In contrast, neither AIRF AA nor § 1307.31 provide a system of
nearly universal exemptions. In fact, they are the only exemptions to the
prohibition on peyote use and possession, and they have a very narrow
scope. Both § 1307.31 and AIRF AA are provided in recognition of the
congressional interest in preserving Native American culture. 79 Given the
narrow scope of both exemptions and the stated Congressional interest, it
seems apparent that they both pass the constitutionality requirements of
Smith.
Indeed, courts considering the matter before Smith were relatively
consistent in holding that the government could meet the compelling interest test while granting the administrative exemption provided by
§ 1307.31. 80 Even assuming that the exemptions provided under federal
law place the question within the compelling interest scheme because of
a lack of neutrality, unconstitutionality is not a foregone conclusion, and
courts are likely to continue to uphold the exemption in the face of free
exercise challenges.
Having determined that the exemptions provided by AIRF AA and
§ 1307.31 do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, both Establishment
Clause and Equal Protection arguments will now be considered in tum.

3. Establishment Clause v. Equal Protection analysis
When examining § 1307.31 and the AIRF AA exemptions, two similar arguments are often made. First, opponents of the restrictive exemptions argue that the provision of an exemption to one religion and not another constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 81 Secondly, they argue that AIRFAA's allowance for peyote use by members of federally recognized Indian tribes and not by
those of different races violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 82 To determine which mode of analysis to use, the
words of the Fifth Circuit are instructive, "[ w]hile we recognize that the
establishment clause exists to ensure government neutrality toward religion, we agree with Justice Harlan that '[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis. "' 83
79. See H.R. RFP. No. 103-675, at 8-9 (1994).
80. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342, !346 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (holding that "government's overriding concern for the protection of the public welfare" justifies restrictions on right to freely exercise religion); see also United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp.
595,599 (D.N.D. 1984) (holding that compelling interestjustilies prohibiting peyote possession and
use).
81 Sec, e.g. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir.
1991).
82. See. e.g, Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 660.
X3. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1217 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 ( 1970)).
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It seems that, despite their separate constitutional origins, the Establishment and the Equal Protection Clauses are related to one another in
this context. For reasons that will later become evident and because the
exemptions may be read as excluding some individuals on the basis of
religion and some on the basis of race, the Equal Protection and the Establishment Clause arguments will be addressed separetaly.
a. Establishment Clause analysis generally. According to a leading
case in the area, "[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."84 Thus, in the ordinary case, a law granting such a preference
would be invalidated unless "justified by a compelling governmental interest, and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest." 85 However,
the judicial task is complicated in the case of the present exemptions because the denomination preferred by that regulation is the Native American Church. 86
The complication stems from the nature of the Native American
Church which is culturally tied to the Native Americans. Further, Congress has the special role of preserving Native American self-governance
and culture. 87 Citing Morton v. Mancari, the Fifth Circuit has outlined
the various sources of Congress's duty to preserve Native American culture:
(I) the historically unique guardian-ward trust relationship of the federal government with quasi-sovereign Native American tribes; (2)
Congress' plenary power to "regulate Commerce ... with the Indian
Tribes" under the Constitution's Article I, section 8; (3) the federal
government's Article II, section 2 treaty power; and (4) a line of cases
in which the Court has upheld legislation preferentially treating Native
88
Americans who are tribal members or live on or near a reservation.

It is evident from both Morton and the Fifth Circuit's Thornburgh
case that there is a significant body of law giving preferential treatment
to Native Americans because of their unique status. In the words of another court:

84. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 ( 1982).
85. !d at 247 (internal citations omitted).
86. The Native American Church as referred to in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 has been variously
interpreted to mean any Native American Church or the Native American Church of North America.
See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-38 (D.N.M. 1991) (holding that the regulation
refers to all members of the Native American Church, regardless of race--the Native American
Church of North America only has members of Native American descent); but see Thornburgh, 922
F.2d at 1212 (citing the prohibition against "peyote possession by all except members of the Native
American Church of North America").
87. Sec Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,554-55 (1974).
88. Peyote Way Church ofGod, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians
living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians were deemed
invidious racial discrimination, the entire Title 25 of the United States
Code would be effectively erased, and the solemn commitment of the
United States toward the Indians would be jeopardized. 89
Congress itself recognized this role when it enacted the exemption for
Native Americans provided by AIRFAA. 90
Facially, an evaluation of the constitutionality of the AIRFAA exemption from prosecution for peyote use by certain individuals reveals
no denominational preference that would subject it to Establishment
Clause scrutiny. The AIRFAA exemption relies not on an individual's
religious preference next but on his being a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. 91 Seemingly, such a purely racial/political preference
is not subject to evaluation under the Establishment Clause. However, it
does prefer religion generally as it allows the use of peyote only when it
is done "for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with
the practice of a traditional Indian religion.'m This likely places
AIRFAA's exemption squarely within the domain of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
The exemption under § 1307.31 is more explicitly denominational. It
applies to members of a particular denomination while excluding all others.93 Because the exemptions implicate Establishment Clause concerns,
their constitutionality will be addressed.
b. Establishment Clause Challenges to the §1307.3 I exemption. This
section will examine a minimal number of cases that have reviewed
§ 1307.31 's exemption to expose the relevant considerations in the Establishment Clause analysis. While not exhaustive, the treated cases are representative, and any discussion of additional cases would only be duplicative.
Cases dealing with the regulatory exemption have generally failed to
fully address all relevant considerations in making Establishment Clause
determinations. In perhaps the most thorough case, Thornburgh, decided
by the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, the
court noted the difficulties presented when it must balance competing
constitutional considerations. Thornburgh involved a church-not a Na-

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D.N.D. 1984).
See H.R. REP. No. 103-675, at 8-9 ( 1994).
See42 U.S.C.A. § 1996a(c)(l994).
!d. § 1996a(b )(I).
See21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2001).
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tive American Church in any sense~seeking a declaratory judgment extending the ~ 1307.31 exemption to allow its use of peyote. On one hand,
the court was forced to confront the proposition that the regulatory exemption was facially preferential. On the other hand, it attempted to give
due weight to the government's protective role toward Native Americans. Seeing these problems, the court noted:
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal government
and Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of
church and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The federal government cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector
of tribal Native Americans and apply conventional separatist under94
standings ofthe establishment clause to that same relationship.

The textual basis for the Fifth Circuit's statement that Congress has a
"constitutional" duty to protect Native American culture is not clear.
However, it is evident that Congress has been given substantial leeway
by the judiciary in enacting preferentiallegislation. 95 This leeway has included upholding legislation that would otherwise violate separate constitutional provisions. 96 The Thornburgh court, after noting these concerns, accepted the government's contention that the Native American
Church of North America is the only "tribal Native American organization ... that uses peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies." 97 On that
ground, it held that the "federal NAC exemption represents the government's protection of the culture of quasi-sovereign Native American
tribes and as such, does not represent an establishment of religion in contravention of the First Amendment." 98
Perhaps one flaw in the Thornburgh analysis of the Establishment
Clause problems caused by ~ 1307.3 I' s exemption is that it failed to consider the Supreme Court's command in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.
99
that churches must be excluded from governmental functions. Larkin
challenged a statute which gave churches essentially a veto power over
the issuance of a liquor license to a business near the church. The Court,
finding a violation ofthe three-part Lemon test, 100 essentially forbade any

94. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991 ).
95. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974) (upholding legislation that would
otherwise constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment so long as it is rationally related to Congress's obligation toward Native Americans).
96. See genemlly. id. at 554-55.
97. Thornhurgh, 922 F.2d at 1217.
9K ld
99. 459 lJ.S. 116, 126-27 ( 19X2).
100. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 lJ.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (holding that a statute preferring
religion "must have a secular purpose," the principal etlect of which "neither advances nor inhibits
religion" that docs "not ti.1stcr an 'excessive government entanglement with religion'").
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religious group from determining to whom a governmental benefit will
be applied.
The same situation is presented by the exemption offered in
§1307.31. In defining its membership, as any church, the Native American Church essentially determines who may receive the benefit of
§1307.31 's exemption. This is precisely what Larkin forbids. It seems
evident that the Thornburgh court, had it considered the question, would
have relied upon the same reasoning to avoid Larkin as it did to avoid
other Establishment Clause cases-the relationship between Congress
and the Indian tribes is unique and prevents such separation.
Another case upholding § 1307.31 against challenges for violations of
the Establishment Clause, Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 101
dealt with a challenge by one professing to use marijuana as a religious
sacrament. Though the Olsen case does not deal squarely with questions
raised by this Note, 102 the dissenting judge's opinion is relevant here. 103
He stated that the "Church's status as an indigenous faith does not affect
104
The majority had used an equal protection
its religious character."
analysis and had not squarely faced the competing interests addressed by
the court in Thornburgh. Despite the dissent's correct observation that
the Establishment Clause was the correct method of analysis, it fails to
give any weight to the government's duty to protect Indian culture. 105 Instead, it detaches that culture from Native American religion. As noted
above, however, that cannot be done. Native American religion and culture cannot be divorced from one another. 106
The cases above illustrate that a few separate principles govern the
jurisprudence in the area pertinent to this Note. The beginning point for
the appropriate Establishment Clause analysis, found in Larkin, is that a
church may not perform governmental functions without running afoul
107
of the Establishment Clause.
However, this limitation is qualified by
the reality that Congress has long been given considerable leeway in enacting legislation that gives preferences to Native Americans. Recognizing Congress's role, the rule of Morton provides that a law that facially

101. 878F.2d 1458(D.C.Cir.l989).
l 02. The Olsen court decided that there was no need to apply the strict scrutiny tests in these
areas because the parties were not similarly situated in that the controlled substances they sought to
use were different-marijuana and peyote-and the government"s interest in controlling each was
ditTcrent. See id at 1460-61.
101 See id. at 1468-72 (Buckley. J. dissenting).
I 04. !d. at 1469.
I 05. See id. at 1468.
106. See Beeson, supra note 32, at 1127 (stating that "in traditional Native American thought
there is nothing that can be labeled nonreligious").
107. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982).
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violates a constitutional provision, because it gives a preference to Native Americans, must only be rationally related to the government's
power to protect Native Americans as a political unit in order to survive
a constitutional challenge. 10 x The next section will apply this framework
to determine the constitutionality of AIRF AA and § 1307.31.
c. The complete Establishment Clause analysis. In addition to the
above analytical framework, there are other factors that must be weighed
in considering the constitutionality of the exemptions. The most important of these are the nature and structure of the Native American Church,
including the Native American Church of North America and the extent
of integration between Native American culture and religion. Reviewing
all these factors, courts could ultimately conclude that the regulatory exemption provided by § 1307.31 is unconstitutional while the AIRF AA
exemption is free of such infirmity. This is so because the preference
found in AIRF AA is not so overtly denominational, and AIRF AA is not
plagued by the imprecision present in § 1307.31.
No matter what interpretation of "Native American Church" is followed, § 1307.3\ clearly violates the rule established by the Supreme
Court in Larkin. It provides that the Native American Church may,
through admitting or refusing admittance to individuals, define the scope
of the exemption. Thus, in order to survive, the exemption must fall under Morton's rule that, "[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians, legislative judgments will not be disturbed." 109 In order to find that
the treatment is tied to that obligation, a court would need to find that the
preservation of peyote usc by members of the Native American Church
is a rational method of preserving the Native American culture of using
peyote. Such a finding might be difficult when the regulation is so imprecise.
The Boyll court illuminated § 1307.31 's imprecision when faced with
a challenge by a non-Native American member of one branch of the Native American Church. 110 It refused to follow the government's interpretation of§ 1307.31 that the "Native American Church" meant the Native
American Church branches that require Native American descent. 111 Had
the government taken the position that the regulation applied to nonNative American members of the Native American Church, its equal pro-

I OX. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 lJ .S. 535, 551-55 ( 1974 ).
109. ld at 555. Note that .Morton dealt v.ith the Due Process Clause of the Fitlh Amendment.
The reasoning in Morton that the rational relationship test governs applies to Establishment Clause
cases as well.
110 See United Stales v. Boy II, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.N.M. 1991 ).
I I I See id at 1339-40.
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tection arguments would be significantly weaker. The government would
find it more difficult to claim that the exemption was given in recognition of Native Americans' political status when it extended the exemption to anyone who was a member of a specific religion. Thus, it was
placed in the position of arguing that the exemption was limited by a
qualification not in the language of the regulation. Plainly, there is no racial requirement in § 1307.31. 112
Though the Boyll court's analysis was flawed in other areas, its discussion illustrates problems with § 1307.31. In the event a court accepts
the reading that § 1307.31 applies only to Native American members of
the Native American Church, it may determine that the exemption is
constitutional. Important in this determination is the fact that Native
American religion and culture cannot be viewed apart. 113 However, given
the differing interpretations of the regulation, it is probable that some
courts might continue to hold that § 1307.31 's exemption is rationally related to preserving Native American culture and thus, an allowable preference. Other courts will likely continue to refuse such a blatantly preferential exemption. Either position seems tenable, though the regulation
injects confusion into the analysis.
The exemption provided by AIRF AA presents no such blatant denominational preference because it applies to a member of a federally
recognized tribe. 114 This exemption is offered less to a religion than to a
political classification, and it seems more in line with the policy justifications outlined in Morton. Additionally, AIRF AA clearly defines the limits of its application, unlike § 1307.31, which is subject to varying interpretations. Thus, even if the restriction of AIRF AA to "religious
ceremonies" results in a violation of Larkin, AIRF AA more readily affects a political preference as required by Morton. This is especially so if
one understands the structure of the Native American Church and Native
American culture.
As noted above, the Native American Church of North America is
essentially the protector of peyote religion. 115 It has a racial component
that many other Native American Churches do not. 116 Though the
"mother church," as the Native American Church of North America is
often known, is not a tribe, it has been held the "only tribal Native
American organization of which the government is aware that uses peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies" and the only one entitled to the
See21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2001).
See Beeson, supra note 32.
114. See42U.S.C.A.§ 1996a(l994).
115. See S"II·WART, supra note 5.
116. See id.
112.

113.
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same protection as Native American individuals and tribes. 117 This
proposition might go too far, but it illustrates that the role of religion in
Native American culture cannot be denied or circumvented. Thus, without allowing the exemption for the religious use of practitioners who
happen to be members of the Native American Church of North America, there would be no exemption as no other group practices peyote religion in the manner contemplated by the government when enacting
AIRF AA. It seems that it~ in fact, Congress does have a duty, as noted in
Morton, in preserving Native American culture, it must be allowed to
fashion an exemption to its controlled substance laws with a religious
component.
Understanding that a rational relationship test governs the balancing
of the competing interests of the Establishment Clause and that the government has a guardian/ward relationship, it seems that the exemption
contained in AIRF AA is constitutional while questions surrounding
1307.31 's constitutionality persist.
d. Equal Protection Clause challenges generally. Though the analysis in Equal Protection Clause cases is, at least in the present context,
remarkably similar to that in Establishment Clause cases, it docs have a
different focus. The critical question to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated is whether there is a denominational
preference and, more importantly, what role the government's duty toward Native American culture plays. In equal protection cases, the question turns not on denominational preferences but on whether there is a
racial preference. This is important because equal protection claims are
easily overcome when preferences are given for political reasons rather
than racial. 118 Thus, in the absence of a racial preference, the exemptions
provided both by 1307.31 and AIRF AA will likely survive equal protection scrutiny. However, such a preference arguably exists in~ 1307.31,
which can be read as applying only to those members of the Native
American Church that are ofNative American descent.
Cases addressing 1307.31 's exemption have answered the equal
protection question in different ways, and some courts have avoided the
119
question altogether. For example, the court in Boyll avoided the critical
equal protection question and gave no deference to the administrative interpretation that § 1307.31 applied only to Native American members of
the Native American Church. Boyll did not accept the government's contention that the exemption represents a political, rather than racial, dis-

*

*

*

117. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991 ).
118. See. e.g. United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595,600-01 (D.N.D. 1984) (applying a
rational basis test afler concluding that classification was political, not racial).
119. See. e.g, United States v. Boy II, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1338-39 (D.N.M. 1991 ).
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tinction, 120 which would ordinarily result in a lower level of Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny. 121 Instead, the court offered in dicta that a distinction based on Native American descent would likely offend the Constitution.122 Boyll did not specifically address the Equal Protection Clause,
because it read the language of the regulatory exemption as providing relief to all members of the Native American Church. 123 However, in addressing its reasons for so reading the exemption, it cited a court's duty
to avoid construing the exemption in a manner that might be unconstitutional and opined that a racial reading would raise doubts about the exemption's constitutionality. 124 The court failed to even address the government's duty toward Native Americans and Morton's command that
preferences should not be racial in character. Though following the plain
language of the regulation might plausibly lead to the conclusion that the
exemption applies to all members of the Native American Church, regardless of race, the persuasiveness of the court's opinion in Boyll is
greatly diminished by its failure to address the government's duty toward
Native Americans cited in Morton.
By returning to the Thornburgh case, one can gain a better understanding of the role of courts in equal protection cases. The court begins
its analysis by noting the general proposition that equal protection "mandates similar treatment under the law for those similarly situated." 125 It
then discusses Morton's political/racial distinction and notes that racial
preferences will be subjected to strict scrutiny. 126 In answering the political/racial question, the Thornburgh court reviews the evidence surrounding the Native American Church 127 and concludes that the classification
is a political one. 128
At least one other court has considered the make-up and position of
the Native American Church of North America in Native American culture in answering the equal protection question. 129 Applying this analysis
120. See id. at 1339 (discussing racial component of the regulatory exemption).
121. See Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 600-01. See generally Morton, 417 U.S. at 554-55 (holding
that legislation preferring Native Americans is based on a political, not racial, classification and
should be rationally related to government's obligation toward Native Americans).
122. See Boy!/, 774 F. Supp. at 1340 (stating that a "racially restrictive" reading would raise
constitutional concerns of the sort to be avoided when interpreting statutes).
123. See id. at 1338-40.
124. See id. at 1339.
125. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1991 ).
126. See id. at 1215.
127. The court, though not specifying so, was referring to the Native American Church of
North America. This is evident by its discussion of the ethnic descent requirement cited by the court.
See id.
128. See id.
129. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (holding that Native American Church of North America is sui generi.1· and "should be viewed
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to AIRF AA, it seems even easier to find that the classification is political. This is because AIRF AA requires membership in a federally recognized tribe rather than merely requiring Native American descent. Additionally, courts reviewing AIRF AA will not need to address the question
of whether the plain language of the regulation allows the government's
restrictive interpretation thereof.
Having found a political, not racial preference, the next step a court
needs to take to determine if the Equal Protection Clause is violated is to
evaluate whether the "rational relationship" test is met. 130 The Thornburgh court concluded, "[ w ]e hold that the federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their centuries-old tradition
of peyote use is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American culture." 131 The consideration of this
rational relationship test is the same in Establishment Clause cases.
It is worth noting that a decision holding the classification to be racial rather than political would not automatically equate to unconstitutionality of the exemption. 132 A court would next be left to determine
whether there was a compelling interest, the fulfillment of which was accomplished by a narrowly tailored exemption. 133 On its face, it seems
that the historical and constitutional duty to protect Native American culture might pass the compelling interest test. The exemptions provided by
AIRF AA and the DEA's regulatory exemption are narrowly tailored to
meet the interest noted in Morton. This seems evident when one places
peyote use in its proper context and is aware of the reality that there can
be no traditional cultural peyote use apart from religious ceremonies.
That is, the statute allows only that use which is necessary to preserve the
culture ofNative Americans.
Taking a different tack, a federal district court in Kansas considering
the equal protection implications of the exemptions for Native Americans answered the "similarly situated" question by resorting to three different justifications, only two of which are applicable here. 134 This was

as a statement that the Native American Church 'is of its own kind or class, that is, the only one of
its own kind"').
130. See Thornhurf'h, 922 F.2d at 1216.
131 ld
132. See id. at 1214 (stating that racial classifications are subjected to strict scrutiny). It is also
worth noting here that a holding of unconstitutionality may not accomplish the objectives of the objector. Extending an unconstitutional exemption to others in the face of Congressional intent to limit
peyote use as much as is prudent is far from intuitive. Rather, it seems more reasonable for a court to
declare the exemption unconstitutional and apply the controlled substance laws across the board.
133. See id. at 1214-15.
134. See McBride v. Shawnee County, Kan. Ct. Serv., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100-02 (D.Kan.
1999) (agreeing with Kansas Court of Appeals that differences in patterns of drug usage and the political position of the Native American Church place the groups in ditTcrcnt situations for equal pro-
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done in denying a Rastafarian group's claim that they were entitled to
free religious use of marijuana. Following the usual pattern, seen above,
the court held that the political position of the Native American Church
removed the exemption from strict scrutiny. 135 Somewhat unique to this
case is its discussion of the patterns of drug use among the different religious groups. 136 In the court's words, "[t]he two religions are not similarly situated because the circumstances surrounding their drug use is
drastically different." 137 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
the Rastafarians' use of marijuana was relatively uncontrolled, unlike
Native American use of peyote. 138 The use of marijuana by Rastafarians
139
"whenever the mood strikes" is markedly different than the controlled
use of peyote in lengthy ceremonies by members of the Native American
Church of North America-a critical distinction to the McBride court. 140
The court noted that such marijuana use posed a much greater problem
for law enforcement officials than peyote use by members of the Native
American Church ofNorth America. 141 This justification for holding that
the parties were not similarly situated might be extended to prevent peyote use by many Native American Churches.
The peyote ceremony as practiced by the Native American Church of
North America is not the only use of peyote in connection with the various branches of the Native American Church. 142 According to one Native
American Church website, it uses peyote more generally than other Native American Church. 143 In fact, the Oklevueha branch claims to have
seven different ceremonies, and it "believes that the use of Peyote can
enhance every ceremony, should the spirit dictate the need." 144 This
broad use of peyote whenever "the spirit dictate[ s]," although a religious
use, unlike the lengthy peyote ceremony described earlier in this Note,
does nothing to further the congressional goal of preserving traditional
Native American culture. Given that it does not fulfill that goal, the use
by churches such as Oklevueha falls under Smith's general Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence, which empowers states to prohibit peyote use.
tcction analysis).
135. See id at 1102.
136 Sec id at II 0 I.
137.

ld

13X. See id
139 IJ.
140. See id (noting that enforcement difficulties stemming from uncontrolled marijuana usc
prcscns a markedly different scenario than the exempted usc of peyote).
141 See id
142. See Oki<'Vll<'ha Farrh Walks Native American Church of Urah. Inc. (last modi tied Sept.
2!>. 200 I)~ http//:www.earthwalks.com/nacindex.html>.
143 . .'ice id (stating "loither NACs do not use the Peyote as generally as we do").
144. See id
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B. Eliminating§ 1307.31 to Avoid Constitutional Problems
Despite many decisions involving the regulatory exemption, litigation on these points persists. It is evident from the discussion above that
AIRF AA has a better prospect for constitutionality than the expressly
denominational and arguably politically/racially preferential § 1307.31.
Because of that, Congress may benefit from legislative elimination of
§ 1307.31 and leaving AIRF AA on its own to resist constitutional challenges. This proposed change would not eliminate the concerns of many
who participate in peyote ceremonies but would add greater weight to the
constitutional arguments for a limited exemption. Inevitably there will be
those excluded who would assert the same constitutional arguments addressed above. However, without the blatant denominational preference
or the interpretation problems plaguing § 1307.31, those arguments would
be less likely to prevail.

IV.

CONCLUSION

While the current exemption structure seems to provide ample protection to Native Americans practicing peyote religion, continuing challenges to the constitutionality of the exemptions by non-Native Americans indicates that Congress could strengthen and clarify the exemption
to avoid future problems and court challenges. The analysis of constitutionality in this Note is aligned with the majority of judicial decisions on
the matter and much of the thinking on the topic.
Clearly, it is within Congress's power to prohibit all peyote use, even
for religious purposes. 145 This essentially answers questions of constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause matters are likewise constitutional under AIRF AA, though that conclusion is not so evident.
Because Native Americans occupy a unique place in American history,
Congress has been given a correspondingly unique power to preserve
Native American culture. In recognition of this power, courts have allowed preferential treatment of Native Americans whenever that treatment bears a corresponding rational relationship. 146 AIRF AA' s exemption allowing peyote use by Native Americans survives constitutional
scrutiny because of Congress's power and duty to preserve Native
American culture. Though the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Morton, requiring only a rational relationship, is helpful in getting
AIRF AA over constitutional hurdles, it is not necessary. Because of the
145. See generally l'mploymcnt Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding that peyote use may be prohibited).
146. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,554-55 (1974).
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unique role Congress has toward Native Americans, it is likely that
AlRF AA could pass the strict scrutiny tests that would be mandated by
findings of denominational and racial preferences.
The current administrative regulation, 21 C.F.R. ~ 1307.31, has raised
more constitutional questions than necessary to allow peyote use by Native Americans in traditional religious services. The biggest problem
with the current exemption scheme is clarity. By limiting the application
and scope of the federal exemptions and by eliminating ~ 1307.31, Congress can ensure more uniform treatment from the courts.

Christopher Parker

